regulates matters that also are covered by national law, 5 the existence of MSENs across the international/national divide norms will increase.
If international norms and their national counterparts are fully identical, no problems of inconsistency, or conflicting prescriptions, or authorizations need arise. Both norms will prescribe or authorise the same behavior. Performance of the international obligation will imply performance of national law, and vice versa. That may be the case in situations of automatic incorporation, 6 use of specific rules of reference, 7 or literal transformation (or as it is sometimes called: 'legislative ad hoc incorporation') of an international obligation in national law. 8 However, identity between an international norm and its national counterpart is not guaranteed. For one thing, in case of 'legislative ad hoc incorporation' the content of a national norm frequently is not fully identical to the underlying international norm. For instance, many national criminal laws are either broader or narrower in terms of the definition of international crimes than the international definition of such crimes. 9 Frequently, the same will hold true for fundamental rights. Moreover, even if the contents of a domesticated norm is identical to the international original at the moment that that international norm becomes part of the national 5 JHH Weiler, 'The Geology of International Law: Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy' (2004) 64 Heidelberg legal order, over time that identity may be lost. Subjected to differing normative systems and institutions, the international and the national variant of a norm may start to differ, leading to different and perhaps even competing prescriptions or authorisations.
At a systemic level, the separate existence of international norms and their national counterparts may have implications for the unity of international law. That unity is already limited at the international level. 10 These limits are multiplied by diverging interpretations at the national level. National laws and national organs interpret and apply international obligations in multiple ways and often contradict or even override them. This undermines not only uniform interpretation, but also essential features of the rule of law, notably generality, equality of application and certainty.
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To some extent, divergent interpretations at national level are an inevitable and even necessary consequence of the structural dualistic relationship between the international and the national legal order. The margin of appreciation doctrine is one of many reflections of this divide. 12 Indeed, it might be argued that the aspiration of unity of international law is and should be confined to the international level proper. However, given the frequent interactions between international and national law, surely some limits to national variations have to be set. is given at national level. To limit the ambition of unity to the international level would make that a sterile and esoteric notion, devoid of much practical relevance.
This chapter will address one set of rules that may help to moderate the divergence between international norms and the national versions of such norms, and the resulting divergence of interpretations between states. It will discuss to what extent secondary rules of international law can induce convergence between international norms and domesticated international norms. I use the term 'secondary rules' to refer to those rules that define the normative context within which primary norms function and that thereby affect the operation of such primary norms. 13 Secondary rules include rules of interpretation, rules of change and rules of responsibility. 14 Whether two identical primary norms are given the same interpretation, or applied in a similar manner, depends in part on the question of whether they are governed by the same secondary rules.
The question then arises whether national courts, or other national organs that interpret or give effect to an international obligation that has been made part of national law, are to give effect to the same secondary rules that guide the interpretation and application of that norm in the international legal order. Should a national court interpret and apply national rules that are equivalent to an international norm, in the light of (secondary) international principles of interpretation? Or should they apply them as national rules in the light of national principles of interpretation? Should, for instance, a national court that considers individual criminality for 13 The national practice that falls in this category can be further divided into two categories.
One category takes a narrow approach and confines international principles of interpretation to rules of national law that incorporate or transform a particular treaty obligation in national law.
This category includes, in states with a system of automatic incorporation, international supremacy of international law proclaims that international law is to set aside national law -a principle that in certain respects can be considered as a secondary rule.
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In principle, the claim to supremacy of international law is confined to the international level. It is at that level that states cannot invoke national law to justify the non-performance with an international obligation, and it is at that level that international courts, by virtue of their establishment under international law, have to give precedence to international law over national law.
36
However, some states have given effect to the international secondary (conflict) rule and have perceived the principle of supremacy as requiring that international law -once duly introduced in national law -also in the domestic legal order prevails over national law. For
instance, the open nature of the Dutch legal system can be traced to the legislature's belief that international law required that Dutch law be set aside whenever it conflicts with treaty law. Fifth, secondary rules of international law that are used to determine the consequences of breaches of international obligations may, directly or indirectly, influence the consequences that at national level are or should be attached to breaches of the national manifestations of that obligation. In many states national courts have followed international principles of attribution or reparation.
42 Thereby, at the national level some degree of unity is maintained between the application of an international norms and its domestic manifestation.
Each of these five manifestations can help to maintain a certain unity between international obligations, on the one hand, and the domestic manifestations of such obligations, on the other.
Thereby they may counteract the pull to fragmentation that is the natural result of the 40 
Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia on a Request for Constitutional

A. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO GIVE EFFECT TO SECONDARY NORMS
Some secondary rules contain an obligation to give effect to such rules. Of the five types of rules discussed in section II, this holds in particular for the principles of responsibility and, more controversially, supremacy. It is difficult to conceive of principles of interpretation or change in terms of international obligations, even though it may be argued that the interpretation to be given to domesticated norms should be affected by a more general obligation to ensure conformity between international and national law. However, customary international law has not (yet) followed the example of EC law, which has established that an individual who suffers damage as a result of a failure of a member state to respect his or her obligations under Community law enjoys a right of reparation for the damage caused by such unlawful behaviour, which must be allowed to be exercised in the national legal order. 63 Obligations to provide reparation frequently are formulated by international courts that have determined that reparation is due, in particular when the constituent treaty provides that judgments of that court are binding on the state concerned. 64 On this basis a decision of an international court relating to the (non-)performance of an international obligation, may, depending on the national law of the state concerned, have effects at national level. Indeed, the Italian Court of Cassation has said that when the ECtHR established a violation of rights under the ECHR, individuals might rely upon a right to reparation, either of a pecuniary nature or as restitutio in integrum, which the national courts were obligated to enforce.
The conclusion is thus that if a national court determines that an international obligation has been breached, certain secondary obligations may be applicable, particularly in the sphere of reparation. Such secondary rules may result in a convergence between the meaning and application of equivalent norms at international and national level.
However, basing the application of secondary principles by national courts on express secondary obligations has only limited explanatory or normative power for our present inquiry.
Its power would seem to be confined to principles of reparation and will not easily cover other types of secondary rules. Many other principles of international responsibility (such as principles of attribution and circumstances precluding wrongfulness) are not easily phrased in terms of obligations binding on a state. The same is true for principles of interpretation or rules of change.
It is for that reason that we have to consider (in sections IV-V below) alternative bases for the application of secondary rules at national level.
B. NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO GIVE EFFECT TO SECONDARY NORMS
Before discussing alternative normative foundations of the domestic effect of secondary rules, it is relevant to point out that in certain cases, national law provides for such effect. 
IV. THE ESSENTIAL CONNECTION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY NORMS
The proper basis for giving domestic effect to secondary rules of international law is the essential connection between such norms, on the one hand, and primary norms, on the other. Secondary norms determine the existence and meaning of a primary norm and the consequences of its breach. It may be argued that the fundamental connection between primary and secondary norms should not be broken when a primary norm is transplanted into a national legal system. If a court gives effect to an international obligation disconnected from its secondary context, it does not give effect to that obligation, but to another norm. 69 See Crawford (n 54) 890 (noting that 'the secondary rules of state responsibility are only indirectly applicable in domestic courts, and they do not require legislative implementation').
HN v Netherlands (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), First instance judgment, LJN:
This is both relevant to the application of national norms by an international court and to the application of international norms by national courts. As to the former, the PCIJ said: 'Once the Court has arrived at the conclusion that it is necessary to apply the municipal law of a particular country, there seems no doubt that it must seek to apply it as it would be applied in that country. It would not be applying the municipal law of a country if it were to apply it in a manner different from that in which that law would be applied in the country in which it is in force.'
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As to the latter, the essential connection between primary and secondary norms may help explain national cases that are guided by corresponding secondary norms of international law, both as regards interpretation 72 and as regards remedies. 73 A particularly far-reaching, though rarely followed example, is the decision of the District Court of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, that in adjudicating claims of Dutch farmers who had suffered damage as a result of discharges of chlorides into the river Rhine by French mines near Strasburg, based its conclusion that a tort had been committed directly on the general principle of (international) law that a wrongful act entails responsibility. 74 Even though such cases are rare, there is a large number of other cases by which courts gave a more modest application to secondary rules and thereby maintained some convergence between the international and the national legal order. It is also this consideration that underlies the significant practice of judicial dialogues between national and international The principle of effective performance of international obligations thus should not be confined to the substantive principles in question, but should extend to the secondary rules that inform the meaning and application of the primary norms, to the extent that this would be necessary to ensure effective application of the international norm in question. A failure to make secondary rules part of national law will not in itself result in an internationally wrongful act. But a failure to give effect to an international obligation with the meaning and contents it has at the international plane may constitute a wrong. For giving effect to an international norm devoid of its international normative context, may well be, to give effect to a different norm.
In the event that a state would have to answer for an alleged wrong before an international tribunal, it would have to convince that tribunal that it did not only give effect to an isolated international norm, but that that norm was interpreted and applied in the meaning that international law ascribed to it. It is this consideration, and the resulting need to give domestic effect to an international obligation in its international context, that explains the tendency of national courts to refer to the interpretative practice of international and foreign courts. desirable to follow the Statute, perhaps to enhance the chances that national trials would be respected under the complementarity principle. In doing so, they may be inclined to interpret provisions of the ICC Statute in line with secondary rules of international law, precisely to enhance the prospect that they will apply the same law as the ICC would apply. Yet, that would not be the result of legal obligation. 84 Likewise, the South African Constitutional Court referred to VCLT to interpret provisions of the Constitution that substantively related to, but formally
were not connected to international norms. 85 In this context it is to be recalled that many, though not all, states apply the presumption of consistent interpretation (that is: national law should be construed as much as possible in conformity with international law) not only to legislation postdating an international obligation, but also to legislation that existed independently and perhaps even before an international obligation came into force. 86 In such cases national courts may still value coherence between national and international law, for instance because they see themselves as part of a larger enterprise in the interest of the international community. This also means that the normative impact of secondary rules of international law may differ between particular rules of international law. For instance, the normative pull of principles of treaty interpretation may be strongest in case of treaties that seek to establish a uniform regime. 88 These considerations may be quite different and in fact less relevant than for a treaty that does not aim to lay down a minimum regime, but only minimum norms, such as the ECHR. 89 Given that it is not (always) possible to construe the impact of secondary rules in terms of an international obligation to give effect to such rules, their impact may be explained in less formal terms. A convenient concept to describe the impact of secondary norms is the notion of 'normative penumbra'. Penumbra means, literally, 'dim light'. It is the outer filamentary region of a sunspot. A 'penumbra' may be any area of transition around an area of great light. The gray area in between the light and the shadow is the penumbra. This use of this term follows the use of the term by US Supreme Court Justice Holmes, who used the term penumbra to refer to 'outer bounds of authority emanating from a law.' 90 Later the Supreme Court used the concept to find that privacy in the 'marital bedroom' is defined in the 'penumbra' of constitutional rights, which do not specifically define a privacy right, but imply it.
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The term normative penumbra is used here to refer to the phenomenon that international norms may exert normative power beyond the international legal system, into its periphery or penumbra. It may be argued that the secondary rules of international law serve as a normative penumbra, that informs the meaning of corresponding rules at national level, and that remain applicable to the interpretation, modification and termination of international obligations at national level. 92 Secondary rules of international law are connected to the primary norms, and when the latter are applied, the former lift along.
VI. THE LIMITING EFFECT OF NATIONAL LAW
The degree in which a domesticated international norm will, in any particular case, be determined or influenced by secondary rules of international law will depend to a large extent on the constitutional principles governing the status of international law in the national legal order.
While secondary rules of international law may have a normative impact in all national legal systems, the foundation and the degree in which they will do so will differ between states. where customary law is automatically part of national law. 95 Courts then continue to apply international law (rather than national law) also after its incorporation into the national legal system. 96 In this situation, secondary rules of international law remain attached to the primary norms and there remains a direct connection between the international origin of a norm and its domestic life. It may not be entirely accurate to say that what national courts apply is exclusively international law, as it is obvious that once the relevant international norms have been made part of national law, they are for all sorts of purposes also part of national law. However, it may at least be said that the domesticated international norm maintains an international quality and that the normative context of the international norms will feed the reception at national level.
To some extent this also applies in another situation, when states use incorporating legislation. This holds both for 'monistic' states (in particular when treaty provisions are not selfexecuting) and 'dualistic' states, that by necessity rely on such legislation. In such cases, the international origin may still be relatively clear when an implementing statute refers to an international norm without copying it. For instance, the immigration rules of the United Kingdom define an asylum applicant as a person who 'makes a request to be recognised as a refugee under the Geneva Convention on the basis that it would be contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under the Geneva Convention for him to be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom'. 97 For the application of this provision, a court will have to interpret the Convention clearly as an international instrument. Another example is the UK Human Rights Act, which clearly is based on the European Convention and that indeed in terms of its interpretation is influenced by the interpretation of the European Convention.
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A different situation arises in a third category, where a treaty is translated into statutes that do not expressly recognize its origin. In these cases the original international quality may go unrecognized. The international origin then may be clouded and, for all practical purposes, the international norm has started indeed to lead a separate, domestic, life. There may a certain paradox here. In particular when an international obligation of non-self executing, domestic legislatures will necessarily have to adopt national law to make it effective and give contents to such an obligation. Yet, the more an international obligation becomes embedded in and made effective in national law, the more the international origin will be lost.
In each of these three situations, national law is likely to set limits to the degree secondary rules of international law indeed may cast their effect into national law. National law and domestic constituencies may counteract the pull towards normative convergence exercised by 97 Para 327a of the Immigration Rules, available at secondary rules of international law. The familiar patterns of collisions between primary norms of international law and national law finds its parallel in potential conflicts between secondary norms of international law and national law. National law will in particular limit the effects of secondary rules of international law in the third situation identified in the previous sub-section (incorporation of an obligation in a statute that no longer displays the international origin), but it also holds for the first two categories, in which various methods may be used to limit the power of courts (or other organs)
to give full effect to the meaning of an international norms as recognized at the international level, for instance by precluding the self-executing nature of a treaty (thus dis-connecting the link between the national norm and its international origin) or by obliging the courts to defer to the executive. For instance, a US Court of Appeals held that there was no need to resort to a review of the travaux préparatoires with regard to an ambiguous treaty provision when enforcement of that provision was controlled by national law. 99 Moreover, in many states, courts tend as a matter of national law to defer to the executive in matters of treaty interpretation 100 An example is the US Military Commissions Act, conferring upon the President the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions that shall be authoritative as a matter of US law, and thus may restrict the scope of interpretation otherwise afforded to the judicial branch. The notion of normative penumbra is not a conflict rule that can resolve conflicts between international law and national law in favour of the former. To the extent that national law indeed pulls in a different direction, similar primary norms, existing at international and national level, indeed will start to lead a different life, each serving different constituencies.
VII. CONCLUSION
Within limits set by the domestic legislature, national courts have considerable leeway in placing their application of an international obligation in its international context. There is a not insignificant and probably increasing practice in which national courts do not just apply single international norms, but give effect to the wider normative context. This practice has great potential in allowing national courts to contribute to a normative convergence between international and national law across legal orders. This practice can only partially be explained in terms of obligations of states to give effect to such secondary norms. Rather, the proper explanation and normative basis may be found in the combination of the connection between primary and secondary norms of international law, and the principles of good faith and effective treaty performance. The result is that secondary rules have the power to project, as a penumbra, their meaning into domestic legal orders that, by way of obligation or otherwise, have adopted equivalent norms. However, the power of the penumbra weakens where national law interjects and imposes its own secondary rules, serving its own domestic purposes.
